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INTRODUCTION

Assume that, tomorrow, a large company advertises a "miracle
pill" that it claims will cure all forms of cancer. The company uses a
sophisticated national marketing campaign to convey a strong health
assurance message, which it tailors to specific audiences: women with
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breast cancer, men with prostate cancer, older adults with intestinal
cancer, and children with leukemia. In response to the national
campaign, consumers across the country purchase the pill, which costs
$10. Only then do consumers discover that the pill is worthless and
that the company intentionally defrauded them.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO")
statute provides a basis for prosecution of the hypothetical company.
In essence, RICO prohibits securing control of an economic enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering.' RICO defines "racketeering
activity" to include mail and wire fraud; 2 thus, it would encompass the
hypothetical miracle pill fraud perpetrated through a national
advertising campaign. RICO's central statutory objective is to deter
the unlawful racketeering conduct it proscribes, and to support this
objective, the statute authorizes dual enforcement: in addition to
providing for public prosecution under § 1964(a), the statute
authorizes private lawsuits by the injured consumers under § 1964(c).
The decision in U.S. v. Phillip Morris U.S.A., Inc.,3 however,
has significantly weakened public prosecution under RICO of the
hypothetical miracle pill company. In Phillip Morris, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
government may not seek the disgorgement of a RICO defendant's
illegitimate profits, including profits acquired by defrauding
consumers. 4 Other federal courts have adopted rules similar to Phillip
Morris U.S.A. 5 Without the disgorgement remedy, the government in
a civil RICO case can request only limited equitable relief under §
1964(a). 6 Thus, private enforcement under § 1964(c)-which is not
restricted to prospective relief-is the more effective vehicle to
vindicate the statute's deterrence objective. Only under § 1964(c) will
perpetrators of mass fraud, such as the company that marketed the

1.
Randy M. Mastro et al., Private Plaintiffs' Use of Equitable Remedies Under the RICO
Statute: A Means to Reform Corrupted Labor Unions, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 571, 575 (1991).
2.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2000 & Supp. II 2002); id. § 1961(1)(B) (2006).
3.
396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
4.
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Disgorgement seeks to extract "all of a defendant's profits resulting from an unfair practice
without regard to whether there is a particular victim to whom the unjust profits should be
paid." Stan Karas, The Role of Fluid Recovery in Consumer Protection Litigation: Kraus v.
Trinity Management Services, 90 CAL. L. REV. 959, 976 (2002).
5.
See, e.g., Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996) (stating that the word
"restrain" in the injunctive provision of the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act prevents
the court from authorizing disgorgement relief because it is not forward looking); United States
v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that disgorgement is only permissible if
designed to restrain and prevent future conduct).
6.
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d at 1200.
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miracle pill, face a real threat of litigation commensurate with their
harmful behavior.
Economic considerations, however, currently cripple private
enforcement of the type of fraud illustrated in the miracle pill
hypothetical. The hypothetical presents "small claim mass fraud":
mass fraud that results in injuries where "the claim of any individual
class member for harm done is too small to provide any rational
justification to the individual for incurring the costs of litigation."7 For
example, the miracle pill campaign harmed millions of consumers. But
each claimant lost only $10. With a potential recovery of only $10, no
individual has incentive to seek redress in the legal system. Even if a
claimant purchased multiple pills over a given time period, litigating a
case against a large company that has defrauded millions of
consumers requires a substantial investment, one that completely
eclipses a paltry individual recovery of $10. Accordingly, no rational
consumer will seek to vindicate his individual claim against the
miracle pill company.
However, where the uniformity of the defendant's conduct
defines the contours of the lawsuit, and where an individual's stake in
the case is too low to make private enforcement viable, claim
aggregation by way of a class action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 ("Rule 23") offers an efficient mechanism to facilitate
private enforcement. While an individual's $10 miracle pill claim is
unmarketable, combining it with the claims of similarly defrauded
miracle pill consumers can make a suit sufficiently attractive for
entrepreneurial attorneys to justify the investment necessary to
pursue the claims in court.
Despite the practical reality that these small claims will be
pursued only in the aggregate, courts repeatedly have rejected class
8
certification of small claim mass fraud actions brought under RICO.
7.
David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Partyand Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
913, 923-24 (1998).
8.
Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1350, 1362, 1366 (1lth Cir. 2002) (requiring each
member of the proposed class in a RICO claim sounding in fraud to prove that they individually
relied upon the misrepresentations, stating that "[t]hese claims will involve extensive
individualized inquiries on the issues of injury and damages-so much so that a class action is
not sustainable" (emphasis added)); Torres v. CareerCom Corp., No. 91-3587, 1992 WL 245923,
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1992) ("The 'by reason of language of § 1964(c) requires a showing of
proximate cause regardless of the requirements for proof of the underlying predicate acts. Thus,
to sustain a § 1964(c) claim, proof of individual causation and reliance is required.... While
proof of individual questions of fact does not automatically doom a 23(b)(3) class certification, in
this case the individual questions predominate over the common ones." (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted)); Rosenstein v. CPC Int'l, Inc., No. 90-4970, 1991 WL 1783, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Jan 8,1991) ("Since § 1964(c) requires a showing of actual injury, plaintiffs must show
that all recovering members of the class reasonably relied upon the alleged fraudulent acts.
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These courts interpret RICO to require that each member of the
proposed class present individualized proof of reliance in order to
establish liability, an interpretation that means individualized
questions will typically predominate over common issues, thereby
defeating class certification.
This Note argues that effective enforcement of RICO is
necessary to vindicate the statute's central deterrence objective. Given
that public enforcement of small claim mass fraud under RICO is
relatively ineffective because the government cannot seek
disgorgement, private enforcement can serve as a valuable
complement. But, for consumers to play any role in deterring mass
fraud where the harm is far-reaching and the individual stake is low,
claim aggregation by way of class actions must be available. This Note
therefore proposes that victims of mass fraud whose individual claims
are small, but whose shared claims are significant, should be allowed
to proceed as a class under RICO, assuming that their claims are
legitimate and that the class satisfies Rule 23's requirements. To
overcome the barrier to class certification posed by fhe current judicial
interpretation of RICO (that individualized proof of reliance is
required to establish liability), this Note suggests re-conceptualizing
the way RICO treats the harm resulting from mass consumer fraud.
Courts interpreting RICO should conceptualize small claim mass
fraud as a cohesive consumer-wide injury, rather than as the sum of
individual injuries. Consistent with this view, courts should allow
class plaintiffs to prove liability at the consumer-wide level, using
aggregate proof. Permitting RICO plaintiffs to prove liability using
aggregate proof achieves the statute's overarching deterrence
objective. It removes the current barrier to class certification-the
requirement of individualized proof-and thereby ensures that
perpetrators of mass fraud face a risk of litigation that truly
corresponds to the harm they caused.

Reliance must be proved on an individual basis, because, as both sides recognize, not all class
members purchased Mazola in reliance of CPC's claim that Mazola consumption could lower
their serum cholesterol level." (emphasis added)); Strain v. NutrilSystem, Inc., No. 90-2772, 1990
WL 209325, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 1990) ("Establishing the causal relationship between the
alleged § 1962 violation and the 1964(c) injury requires proof of reliance. This individualized
proof necessary to establish the 'reliance' from each member of the proposed class presents the
stumbling block to class certification because individual questions would predominate for
purposes of 23(b)(3)."). For a discussion of the class certification problem in a bankruptcy case,
see In re Woldcom Inc., 343 B.R. 412, 424-25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), in which the court responds
to the plaintiff's allegation "that the Debtors engaged in fraudulent or misleading advertising
regarding distinct aspects of the Everyday Plan. As discussed, this requires the Court to make an
individualizeddeterminationof reliance for each Class member" (emphasis added).
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Part I of this Note summarizes the RICO statute. Part II
discusses the problem: courts are denying class certification for small
claim mass fraud actions based on the current judicial interpretation
of RICO. Part III proposes a solution: a re-conceptualization of mass
harm as consumer-wide harm, such that in a small claim mass fraud
action, aggregate proof of RICO's constituent elements can establish
liability and result in an enforceable damage award. This Part also
explains that when courts allow plaintiffs to prove liability under
RICO at the consumer-wide level, using aggregate proof, they
effectuate the statute's primary objective: deterring fraudulent
conduct. Part IV addresses likely due process objections to proposals
incorporating aggregate liability.
I. BACKGROUND: THE RICO STATUTE
RICO has become one of the primary bases for pursuing small
claim mass fraud actions because it provides a federal hook for
complaints that otherwise would be brought as state law tort actions.
Pursuing these claims under a federal statute like RICO is preferable
because it eliminates the choice-of-law problems that plagued earlier
state law-based class actions, such as those against the tobacco
industry. 9 When evaluating whether to certify a multi-state class
action, a court must consider how variations in state law affect the
class. For example, with fraud claims, while some states require
justifiable reliance on a misrepresentation, 10 other states require only
reasonable reliance.1 1 Substantial variations of this nature can
magnify pre-existing class differences and override the common issues
supporting certification.1 2 In contrast, "[b]y its nature, RICO allows
the bringing of a lawsuit that presents a full picture of a criminal
enterprise."1 3 RICO enables class certification of mass fraud that
transcends state boundaries, without having to address the
complication of divergent state laws.

9.
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1996).
10. See Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1996).
11. See Parks v. Morris Homes Corp., 141 S.E.2d 129, 132 (S.C. 1965).
12. See Georgine v. Amchem Prod., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996), affd, Amchem Prod. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (decertifying the class because the legal and factual differences in
the plaintiffs' claims, "when exponentially magnified by choice of law considerations, eclipse any
common issues in this case").
13. Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong.
411, 709-10 (1986) (statement of Daniel H. Bookin, Esq.).
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Congress's announced objective in enacting RICO was to
combat organized crime's expansion into legitimate business. 14 RICO
makes up one title in a larger crime fighting statute, the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970.15 RICO's enactment was motivated
partially by the 1967 Report of the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which revealed a
movement within organized crime away from established revenue
raising activities, such as gambling and prostitution, and toward
legitimate business ventures. 16 This infiltration alarmed Congress
because the Commission believed that
"[ciriminal cartels can undermine free competition" through unfair tactics like price
cutting financed by tax evasion and cash reserves from illegal business, labor
corruption, and violent coercion of suppliers and customers. Moreover, acquisition of
legitimate enterprises gives organized criminals the opportunity to engage in new types
of ("white collar") crime, such as bankruptcy fraud. 17

RICO provided prosecutors with considerably stronger criminal
and civil penalties with which to combat organized crime's expansion
into the sphere of legitimate business.' 8 As the Supreme Court noted,
"the RICO statute was intended to provide new weapons of
unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its
economic roots."'19 The enhanced penalties reflected the need to
improve past enforcement practices that had been ineffective in
dismantling crime organizations. 20 In fact, Congress emphasized the
statute's intentionally broad scope when it explicitly directed that
'21
RICO be construed liberally "to effectuate its remedial purpose.
RICO provides that under § 1964(a), the government can request that
the courts "prevent and restrain" violations of the statute by issuing
appropriate orders, which include, but are not limited to, the examples
22
listed in the provision.

14. "[The purpose of the Act was] to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United
States." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose).
15. Id.
16. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 189-91 (1967) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]; Iannelli v. United

States, 420 U.S. 770, 787 n.19 (1975).
17. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal,PartsI & II, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
661, 670 (1987) (quoting COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 16, at 190).
18. Robert K. Rasmussen, Reforming RICO: Introductory Remarks and a Comment on Civil
RICO's Remedial Provisions, 43 VAND. L. REV. 623, 624 (1990).
19. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
20. Mastro et al., supra note 1, at 574-75.
21. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000).
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Furthermore, to supplement the redoubled public enforcement
effort, Congress also included a "private attorneys general" provision
encouraging private citizens to assist the government in achieving the
statute's overall deterrence objective. 23 Under § 1964(c), "[a]ny person
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court." 24 Modeled after a similar provision in the
Antitrust Laws, 25 RICO's private attorneys general provision
authorizes citizens to bring civil suits for injuries to business or
property resulting from racketeering. Moreover, successful private
plaintiffs are entitled to recover treble damages and reasonable
26
attorney's fees.
Put simply, § 1962 of RICO prohibits securing control of an
economic enterprise through a pattern of racketeering.2 7 While one of
the statute's specific purposes was to deter racketeering within
organized crime, RICO's application has extended far beyond this
paradigm. The government has invoked the statute to pursue claims
of fraud, product defect, and breach of contract involving legitimate
businesses. 28 This extensive application is a product of the statute's
broad language, 29 which reveals that while the fundamental
prohibitions of RICO include the statute's overt goal of targeting

23. Id. § 1964(c).
24. Id.
25. The Supreme Court has remarked on how civil RICO was patterned after the Clayton
Act:
The Clayton Act provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in
any district court of the United States ...and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U. S. C. §
15(a). RICO's civil enforcement provision provides: "Any person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue
therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18
U. S. C. § 1964(c). Both RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy economic
injury by providing for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees. Both
statutes bring to bear the pressure of "private attorneys general" on a serious national
problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate; the
mechanism chosen to reach the objective in both the Clayton Act and RICO is the
carrot of treble damages.
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 150-51 (1987).
26. Id.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
28. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) ("It is true that private
civil actions under the statute are being brought almost solely against such defendants, rather
than against the archetypal, intimidating mobster. Yet this defect-if defect it is-is inherent in
the statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress."); Rasmussen, supra note 18.
29. Rasmussen, supra note 18.
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organized crime, the statute sweeps far beyond that particular
30
problem.
For example, the RICO statute does not define its proposed
target either as the monolithic Mafia paradigm or more generally as
any criminal operation of a legitimate business. 31 Instead, RICO
defines its target functionally.3 2 RICO's target is anyone who performs
the criminal acts proscribed under the statute. The list of what
constitutes a "pattern of racketeering activity" is expansive. 33 As
Professor Robert Rasmussen explained, "almost any connection
between a pattern of racketeering activity and an enterprise engaged
in interstate commerce constitutes a RICO violation .... While
section 1961 purports to define 'pattern of racketeering activity,' in
34
reality it only places modest constraints on the term's outer limits."
RICO identifies myriad racketeering activities that qualify as
predicate offenses, including general proscriptions against the use of
mail and wire to perpetrate fraud. 35 Yet despite its intentionally broad
language, RICO has been read narrowly when applied to small claim
mass fraud actions.
II. THE PROBLEM: UNDER THE CURRENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF
RICO, PRIVATE LITIGANTS IN SMALL CLAIM MASS FRAUD ACTIONS ARE
BEING DENIED CLASS CERTIFICATION

RICO has proven an ineffective vehicle for redressing small
claim mass fraud because courts have denied consumer-plaintiffs class
certification under the statute. Mass consumer fraud is the deception
of a large number of people by means of consumer transactions.
Significantly, the growth of mass production combined with mass
marketing has increased substantially the scale of harm caused by

30. Lynch, supra note 17, at 680.
31. Id. at 683.
32. Id.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2006).
34. Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 625.
35. Id. at 625-26. The inclusion of mail and wire fraud as predicate offenses is a major
reason why RICO applies so broadly:
[B]ecause RICO requires only two acts of mail or wire fraud to establish a violation,
and because each mailing or wire use in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, whether
or not pursuant to the same scheme, constitutes a separate offense, a private right of
action for treble damages is available for violation of section 1962 in virtually every
case of commercial mail and wire fraud.
Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARv. L. REV.
1101, 1104 (1982).
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even a single, uniform deception, resulting in a considerable increase
36
in mass consumer fraud.
A. "Small Claim" Mass FraudActions Defined
This Note focuses specifically on small claim mass fraud
actions. As previously stated, small claim mass fraud presents a
recurring problem: individual plaintiffs lack sufficient economic
incentives to pursue their small claims as individuals. Moreover, the
substantial costs of litigating complex mass fraud claims further
exacerbate this obstacle. 37 In an article written on group litigation,
Professor Samuel Issacharoff expounds on the collective action
barriers to private enforcement of consumer fraud. 38 As he aptly
articulates, the problem afflicting small claim mass fraud is that
"[e]ven if the odds of winning were one hundred percent-a highly
unlikely occurrence-no individual would invest more than the
39
potential claim to pursue the case."
Schwab v. Philip Morris USA Inc., a recent case filed on behalf
of a nationwide class of consumers who purchased "light" cigarettes,
exemplifies this type of small claim action.4 0 The plaintiff consumers
in Schwab alleged that the major cigarette manufacturers
fraudulently marketed "light" cigarettes by claiming that they were
safer than regular cigarettes when the manufacturers knew that
"light" cigarettes delivered the same amount of nicotine. In effect, the
plaintiffs claim that the cigarette manufacturers conspired to deceive
the public. The consumers brought their claims under RICO because,
in reliance on this deceptive advertising, they bought "light" cigarettes
at a price greater than they allegedly would have paid had they known
the truth. They argued that they paid a premium for a safer, and
therefore more valuable, cigarette but got one that was just as
harmful as a regular-priced cigarette. Moreover, by focusing their
claims on the cigarette's loss of economic value, the plaintiffs avoided
the classic problem that has plagued past cigarette litigation: human
diversity (that individuals start and stop smoking, choose between

36. Schwab v. Philip Morris U.S. Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1253 (2006) ("In today's
complex modern economic system,' a single harmful act may have an adverse effect on large
numbers of consumers." (citing Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir.
1965))).
37. Id. at 1240.
38. Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons from the U.S.
Experience, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135, 142-46 (1999).
39. Id. at 145.
40. For the relevant facts of this case, see 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1018-20 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
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various cigarette brands, and fall ill for individualized reasons). 4 1 For
example, the Castano court de-certified a class action against the
American Tobacco Company based on human diversity problems:
The Castano class suffers from many of the difficulties that the Georgine court found
dispositive. The class members were exposed to nicotine through different products, for
different amounts of time, and over different time periods. Each class member's
knowledge about the effects of smoking differs, and each plaintiff began smoking for
different reasons. Each of these factual differences impacts the application of legal
42
rules such as causation, reliance, comparative fault, and other affirmative defenses.

While the Schwab plaintiffs' focus on loss of economic value
may have avoided these diversity issues, the case presents a different
problem, one that plagues small claim mass fraud actions. If courts
require consumers to litigate these types of claims as individuals,
consumers will never proceed with a suit, as the costs of bringing their
claims eclipse their potential individual recoveries.
As Judge Weinstein stated in Schwab:
If each smoker must be considered separately [under RICO], as defendants suggest is
the case, it would be impossible to proceed with a suit of this nature even if it were
absolutely clear that each plaintiff had been damaged in the manner plaintiffs allege.
The transactional costs and the relatively small recovery for the difference in value
between what an individual smoker paid for and what he received would result in

41. The plaintiffs argue that they can avoid the human diversity problem:
first, by the equivalent of statistical averaging and, second, should the jury determine
total damages to the class, division of the damages based on claims of smokers for the
relative number of cigarettes they bought during the applicable liability period, with
unclaimed proceeds to be distinguished on a cy pres basis.
Id. The importance of using statistical averaging as a method of overcoming issues of human
diversity is that it concedes that all consumers have not relied and, as such, simply attempts to
estimate how many did or did not. In this way, statistical averaging (aggregate proof) avoids
individualized assessments, such as why an individual chose a particular brand, focusing instead
on estimating how a class of consumers in the aggregate makes their decisions. See Miles v.
Philip Morris Companies, No. 00 L 0112, 2001 WL 34366710, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Feb. 3, 2001) ("The
Court does not believe that the issue of causation requires a determination as to why each class
member smoked light cigarettes. The gist of Plaintiffs' claims is that these light cigarettes are by
nature of their design not significantly lighter than regular cigarettes and that any person who
purchased defendants' light cigarettes did not get what the defendants purported to sell; i.e., a
'light' cigarette actually containing significantly lower tar and nicotine than regular cigarettes.
This determination may be made without individual proofs as to why each class member smoked
light cigarettes."); Craft v. Philip Morris Co., No. 002-00406A, 2003 WL 23355745, at *8 (Mo. Cir.
Dec. 31, 2003) ("As the Court sees it, however, whether the product is jewelry or a pack of light
cigarettes, it simply doesn't matter what reason or motivation individual class members may
have had for choosing to purchase the product. They purchased a product that was
misrepresented and that, if Plaintiffs allegations here are to be believed, would have had greater
economic value if the false representations had been true. That is consumer fraud if the
allegations are true, and is compensable under the benefit-of-the-bargain rule.").
42. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 743 n.15 (1996).
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damages measured in tens or hundreds of dollars. The huge
costs in bringing this action
43
could not be supported by such individual adjudications.

Thus, given the substantial investment required to litigate a
complex fraud claim, if courts limit litigation of small claim mass
fraud to individualized litigation, a rational plaintiff will never assert
her claim.
B. Obstacles to Private Litigationof Small Claim Mass
Fraudby Class Action
Claim aggregation by way of class action provides an efficient
method by which private parties can seek to redress numerous small
claim harms arising from uniform fraudulent conduct. While the legal
system prefers that everyone litigate in the conventional sense-on
his own behalf-Rule 23 authorizes the use of class actions in specific
circumstances. The class action is "a procedural device developed in
equity, in which the named plaintiffs act as representatives for
themselves and for a class of similarly-situated others in pursuing a
remedy." 44 Its historical objective was to adjudicate questions common
to the class in a single proceeding, rather than requiring consecutive
45
repetitive proceedings.
To justify a deviation from conventional litigation and to
proceed as a class under Rule 23, plaintiffs must meet certain
threshold requirements specified in Rule 23(a): typicality, numerosity,
commonality, and adequate representation. 46 In addition, Rule 23
requires that plaintiffs propose a class under one of three subsections
of Rule 23(b).47 This Note will focus specifically on opt-out class actions
pursued under Rule 23(b)(3), which applies when the relief requested
is exclusively or predominantly money damages. In order to certify an
opt-out class under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must find both that
"questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently

43. Schwab, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.
44. Debra Lyn Bassett, Constructing Class Action Reality, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1415, 1431-32
(2006); see Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948) ('The class
action was an invention of equity, mothered by the practical necessity of providing a procedural
device so that mere numbers would not disable large groups of individuals, united in interest,
from enforcing their equitable rights nor grant them immunity from their equitable wrongs."
(citation omitted)).
45. Bassett, supra note 44, at 1432.
46. FED. R. CIV. PROC.23(a).
47. Id. at 23(b).
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adjudicating the controversy." 48 Thus, for a class to be certified under
Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs must establish typicality, numerosity,
commonality,
adequate
representation,
predominance,
and
superiority.
Class actions are an indispensable mechanism for redressing
claims where the individual stake is low and the uniformity of the
defendant's conduct is high. 49 As the Supreme Court has articulated,
class actions "permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be
uneconomical to litigate individually .... [M]ost of the plaintiffs would
have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available." 50
While each class member's share of recovery alone cannot support
litigation, the collective shares of all the class members can cover the
attorneys' and experts' fees, and transform a lawsuit into one that is
marketable for the class attorney.
For individual claimants, the efficiencies of aggregation include
the ability to redress harms that otherwise would be unmarketable,
the sharing of resources and information with other similar claimants,
and the reduction in legal costs because one lead counsel assumes
responsibility for the case. 51 The Advisory Committee Notes
accompanying the 1966 version of Rule 23 state that "a fraud
perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar
misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action,
and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for
separate determination of the damages suffered by individuals within
the class." 52 Claim aggregation thus provides a method to resolve a
mass fraud in a single proceeding that exerts far less pressure on the
judiciary than the alternative-scores of similar, individual
53
adjudications.
Despite the advantages of aggregating small claim mass fraud
actions brought under RICO, courts generally have rejected such
requests for class certification. Courts ground these rejections on their
interpretation of RICO as requiring individualized proof of reliance

48. Id. at 23(b)(3) (emphasis added).
49. Issacharoff, supra note 38, at 149.
50. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (stating the importance of a
class action where each individual plaintiffs claim was approximately only $100); see also
Abelson v. Strong, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P P93,365 (D. Mass. July 30,
1987) ("[O]ne purpose of the class action device is to permit the aggregation of claims where the
size of those claims individually might otherwise be too small to merit bringing suit.").
51. Shapiro, supra note 7, at 928.
52. FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee's note on 1966 amendment.
53. Id. at 933.
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from each member of the proposed class.54 Courts reason that to
sustain a RICO claim under § 1964(c), a plaintiff is required to
demonstrate that she was injured "by reason of' a pattern of
racketeering.5 5 This proximate cause requirement ensures that
defendants are not held liable for injuries unrelated to their specific
RICO violations. However, courts have read RICO's "by reason of'
constraint narrowly to mandate that each individual plaintiff
demonstrate his or her particular reliance on the fraud, which
resulted in injury. 56 Put simply, courts have read the proximate cause
constraint to require individualized proof of reliance from each
member of the proposed class in order to establish liability under
RICO. This individualized burden forecloses treatment of mass fraud
as a class action. Under such a reading, courts generally hold that
Rule 23(b)(3)'s threshold
requirements
of superiority and
predominance 57 cannot be met because individualized questions
58
always will predominate over common issues.
For example, assume that the consumers defrauded by the
miracle pill company seek certification as a class to redress their
harms. If the trial court requires proof that each member of the class
individually relied on the miracle pill fraud in order to establish
liability under RICO, these individualized inquiries likely will negate
the efficiency of adjudicating the common factual issues (such as the
uniform, national marketing campaign used to perpetrate the fraud)
on a class-wide basis. In effect, courts deny certification in such
situations because they recognize that in practice, where individual
issues predominate, the class action inevitably will degenerate into a
multitude of individual lawsuits. 59 Therefore, courts hold that the
plaintiffs cannot meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23.60
Moreover, the predominance of individual questions of reliance and
54. See supra note 8.
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000); supra note 8.
56. See supranote 8.
57. FED. R. CiV. P. 23(b)(3).
58. See, e.g., Sandwich Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Nat'l Indem. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 205, 211
(5th Cir. 2003) (holding that "[RICO] actions that require proof of individual reliance cannot be
certified as Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) class actions because individual, rather than common, issues
will predominate").
59. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.19 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The
greater the number of individual issues, the less likely superiority can be established.... A
'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class
action because of the likelihood that significant questions ... would be present, affecting the
individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class
action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.' " (quoting FED. R.
CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note)).
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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injury also defeats the superiority requirement of Rule 23, as the class
action device is not the superior method of adjudicating these claims,
given the inefficiencies previously articulated. 6 1 As the Eleventh
Circuit stated, "[I]f the addition of more plaintiffs to a class requires
the presentation of significant amounts of new evidence, that strongly
suggests that individual issues (made relevant only through the
62
inclusion of these new members) are important."
In sum, the current judicial interpretation of RICO, which
requires individualized proof of reliance, generally precludes class
certification. It forces individualized adjudications that will never
occur. Victims never will pursue their individual $10 claims. Thus, the
paradoxical result of these courts' interpretation of RICO is the clear
recognition of a private right of action under § 1964(c) and the denial
of any practical remedy. While the class action mechanism is designed
specifically to overcome the problem that pervades small claim mass
fraud-"that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights," 63courts are unwilling to permit its use. Thus, harmed consumers are
left with no practical avenue by which to redress their wrongs.
C. Inadequacy of Public ProsecutionAlone as a Deterrent
64
RICO authorizes both private and public enforcement.
Indeed, Congress intended private enforcement through civil action to
supplement public enforcement of RICO violations. 65 However, the
recent decision in United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., which
restricted the government to seeking limited equitable relief, has
rendered public enforcement of small claim mass fraud an ineffective
vehicle for deterring mass fraud against consumers. 66 In Phillip
Morris, the Department of Justice, as plaintiff, requested that the
court disgorge the corporate defendant of the illegitimate profits
gained through fraud. 67 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia denied this request, holding that the government may not

61. Id.
62. mlay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1255 (llth Cir. 2004).
63. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
64. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a), 1964(c) (2000).
65. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987)
(noting that civil RICO was designed to "bring to bear the pressure of 'private attorneys' general
on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate").
66. 396 F.3d 1190, 1200-01 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
67. Id. at 1192.
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recover disgorged profits in a RICO action because disgorgement (1) is
not a forward-looking remedy and (2) does not serve to "prevent and
restrain" future conduct as required under § 1964(a). 68 As mentioned
previously, § 1964(a) authorizes the government to request court
orders that are designed to prevent and restrain violations of conduct
deemed unlawful under RICO.
In denying the disgorgement relief, the Philip Morris court
reasoned that allowing the government's disgorgement request might
lead to duplicative recoveries, as disgorgement would allow the
government to seek similar damages to those available to private
plaintiffs under § 1964(c):
[T]he Government's view [is that] it can collect sums paralleling-perhaps exactly-the
damages available to individual victims under § 1964(c). Not only would the resulting
overlap allow the Government to escape a statute of limitations that would restrict
private parties seeking essentially identical remedies, but it raises issues of duplicative
recovery of exactly the sort that the Supreme Court said in Holmes v. Securities Investor
Protection Corp., constituted a basis for refusing to infer a cause of action not specified
by the statute. Permitting disgorgement under § 1964(a) 6would
therefore thwart
9
Congress' intent in creating RICO's elaborate remedial scheme.

In essence, the court denied the government's request for
disgorgement relief in reliance on the effectiveness of private suits
under § 1964(c) to recover the same sums from the defendants. The
plain language of § 1964(c) does not limit private plaintiffs to
prospective remedies designed to "prevent and restrain" future
conduct. Instead, the remedial scheme available under a private right
of action is manifestly broader.
Given the current obstacle to effective public enforcement,
private enforcement must be available to facilitate redress of small
claim mass fraud in support of RICO's deterrence objective. The
economic barriers inhibiting private enforcement of these claims must
be overcome. Because class actions can transform these otherwise
unmarketable individual fraud claims into viable law suits
(facilitating effective private enforcement and vindicating RICO's
deterrence objective), the best solution is to allow victims of mass
fraud whose individual claims are small, but whose shared claims are
significant, to proceed as a class when their claims satisfy the
requirements of Rule 23.

68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 1201 (internal citations omitted).
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III. THE SOLUTION: ALLOWING PRIVATE LITIGANTS TO PROVE RICO's
CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS USING AGGREGATE PROOF

In response to the rise in mass injury claims and courts'
attempts to negotiate the certification decision, some commentators
argued that Congress needed to reform Rule 23.70 This Note, however,
proposes an alternative solution, one that would not require a change
to Rule 23, nor circumvent Rule 23's requirements for class
certification. Any class seeking to aggregate its claims still would have
to satisfy Rule 23's fundamental procedural hurdles of commonality,
numerosity, typicality, adequate representation, predominance, and
superiority.7 1 However, courts
should interpret RICO
as
conceptualizing small claim mass fraud as a cohesive consumer-wide
injury, rather than a sum of individual injuries. Consistent with this
interpretation, courts should allow consumer-plaintiffs to prove
liability at the consumer-wide level, using aggregate proof where
individualized proof of reliance and liability has been required.
This approach is preferable to one focused on reforming Rule
23. Confining the solution to a new interpretation of RICO applicable
to specific claims avoids problems inherent in proposing broad changes
to Rule 23's generally applicable concepts. Trans-substantive
procedural changes can play out in undesirable and unexpected ways
under different substantive regimes.7 2 Moreover, federal courts have
significant interpretive flexibility in construing open-ended, general
statutes like RICO. In addition, this Note's proposed reading of RICO
is limited to fraud claims pursued under the statute because fraud
actions include a crucial impediment to over-deterrence: the
requirement of a specific intent mens rea. Unlike with products
liability and mass tort claims, civil RICO suits predicated on mail or
wire fraud require the mens rea of specific intent. Both the mail and
wire fraud statutes 73 require proof that a person "(1) intentionally
participate[d] in a scheme to defraud another of money or property
and (2) use[d] the mails or wires in furtherance of that scheme."74 To
this end, even if the solution advanced in this Note enhanced private
enforcement by facilitating class certification, devastating increases in
defendant liability and over-deterrence would not result because a
70. See ABA Section of Litig., Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee on
Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195, 196 (1986).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
72. E.g., Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 631 (1994).
73. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
74. Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1498 (11th Cir. 1991).
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class still would have to prove that the defendants intended to defraud
it. Thus, this Note's solution is limited to the fraud context, where
there is a built-in obstacle to over-deterrence: the requirement of a
specific intent mens rea.
Finally, this Note's solution argues that courts should interpret
the substantive law of RICO in light of the procedural avenues for its
enforcement.7 5 The current judicial interpretation of RICO's

substantive law (requiring individualized assessments of reliance for
each member of the proposed class) effectively forecloses class
certification of small claim mass fraud actions, defeating these claims
before they ever reach the courthouse. In contrast, if courts interpret
RICO to allow a showing of aggregate liability to result in an
enforceable damage award, perpetrators of mass fraud face a real
threat of liability. How courts interpret RICO's substantive law
dictates whether small action fraud claims can be certified as class
actions procedurally and, in turn, whether the fraud will be deterred.
Conceptualizing consumer-wide harm as harm in the aggregate
has scholarly support, in the form of an article about punitive
damages written by Professor Catherine Sharkey.76 Furthermore,
small claim mass harm, arguably, may be perceived best by focusing
on the aggregate unit rather than harm to the individual. But most
importantly, permitting RICO plaintiffs to prove liability at the
consumer-wide level, using aggregate proof, faithfully achieves the
statute's overarching deterrence objective. It removes the current
barrier to class certification-the requirement of individualized
proof-and thereby ensures that legitimate claims have a chance to be
redressed so that threatened tort liability corresponds to harm caused.
A. Conceptualizing "MassHarm" as Aggregate Harm
One might understand small claim mass fraud as harm to
numerous distinct individuals. But this Note argues that it is better to
conceptualize such harm as consumer-wide harm in the aggregate.
The nature of small claim mass fraud is inherently different from the
usual type of fraud that occurs in a one-on-one contractual
relationship. As articulated in Schwab, "sophisticated, broad-based
fraudulent schemes by their very nature are likely to be designed to
distort the entire body of public knowledge rather than to individually

75. Generally, substantive law and procedure are treated as independent concepts. This
Note, however, argues that substantive law should be informed by its procedural implications.
76. Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347
(2003).
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mislead millions of people."7 7 Mass fraud is directed at the aggregate
unit; therefore, there are no individual issues. For example, in my
hypothetical, the defendants perpetrated the miracle pill fraud by
using mass marketing that focused on the public, as comprised of
multiple aggregate units, rather than as a sum of individuals. As such,
it is particularly appropriate that the miracle pill plaintiffs be
permitted to rely on aggregate theories of proof to redress their harm.
Moreover, small claim mass fraud is profitable only when it has an
aggregate impact. The miracle pill company does not profit from a
single $10 purchase, but from millions of $10 purchases. Thus, when
evaluating small claim mass fraud, it is arguably more appropriate to
look at the harm in the aggregate. Accordingly, courts should interpret
RICO, as applied to small claim mass fraud actions, in a manner
consistent with the inherent aggregate nature of this type of fraud.
Courts should read RICO to permit aggregate proof of its constituent
elements to establish liability for small claim fraud, rather than to
require that each member of the proposed class present individualized
proof, which blocks any possibility of class certification.
Beyond small claim mass fraud's aggregate nature,
conceptualizing mass harm as consumer-wide harm has some basis in
other scholarship. In an article on the law of punitive damages that
seeks to characterize punitive awards as societal damages, Professor
Catherine Sharkey focuses on a recurring paradigm in the practice of
awarding punitive damages: "a single or multi-plaintiff case in which,
in effect, 'class-wide' punitive damages are assessed on a statewide or
nationwide scale." 78 Juries award plaintiffs large punitive damages to
punish defendants for the harm they caused both to the plaintiffs and
to other individuals not party to the suit. 79 In effect, individual
80
plaintiffs injured by a mass harm are receiving class-wide damages.
For example, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, plaintiffs' counsel incorrectly instructed Utah jurors that
they were "going to be evaluating and assessing, and hopefully
requiring State Farm to stand accountable for what it's doing across
the country, which is the purpose of punitive damages."8 1 Professor
Sharkey's solution to this recurring problem is a re-conceptualization
of punitive damages that explicitly recognizes a new category of

77. 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1047 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
78. Sharkey, supranote 76, at 350.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 349 (emphasis added) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 420 (2003)).
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damages to redress mass harm: compensatory societal damages.8 2 She
proposes understanding punitive damages as a form of "compensatory
damages for harms to individuals other than the plaintiff before the
court."8 3 Pursuant to this theory, a jury, in awarding punitive
damages, first would compensate the specific plaintiffs in the suit,
then explicitly award "societal damages" to the state for the harm
caused to those members of society not party to the suit. In effect,
mass, societal harm would result in an explicit assignment of damages
to society.
While the solution advanced in this Note does not propose a reconceptualization as sweeping as Professor Sharkey's, both theories
conceive of mass harm as "societal harm" rather than the sum of
individualized harms. Professor Sharkey's solution proposes awarding
"compensatory societal damages."8 4 The solution in this Note focuses
on proof. More specifically, it focuses on allowing aggregate, consumerwide statistical evidence to prove the constituent elements of a
consumer-wide harm under RICO. There is, however, another crucial
difference between Professor Sharkey's proposal and this Note's
solution. The latter does not propose an end run around Rule 23;
instead, it requires that members of society participate directly, by
joining a proposed class in litigation to redress consumer-wide harm.
Arguably, this Note's solution is preferable to Professor Sharkey's
because a proposed plaintiff class must meet the threshold
requirements of Rule 23 to proceed as a class in redressing the small
claim mass harm perpetrated against them. By contrast, under
Professor Sharkey's theory, society need not establish standing to
recover compensatory damages, and thus the defendant is not afforded
the protections accorded to class action defendants (who have the
opportunity to defend against all charges). However, beyond these
differences, both theories recognize that mass harm has an inherent
societal element, which should inform either how damages are
awarded (societal compensatory damages) or how liability is
established (aggregate proof).

82. Id. at 389.
83. Id. at 350; see Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due Process
Limits of Punitive Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 979, 980-81 (2001) ("Punitive damages stand as a civil penalty for
transgression of the social compact ....to penalize conduct that violates the social contract and
injures society.'); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Tobacco Wars: Peace in Our Time?, N.Y. L.J., July 20,
2000, at 1 (advocating in favor of "put[ting] the [tobacco] industry's punishment [via punitive
damages] to some socially useful purpose").
84. Sharkey, supranote 76, at 389.
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B. Why Aggregate ProofEffectuates RICO's Essential
Deterrence Objective
Deterrence is a crucial objective of the RICO statute. Congress
modeled RICO after the antitrust laws, which have a clear publicprotection rationale: to protect competition primarily, with the
incidental result of protecting individual competitors.8 5 As the
Supreme Court articulated in Rotella v. Wood, both the antitrust and
RICO statutes "share a common congressional objective of
encouraging civil litigation to supplement Government efforts to deter
and penalize the respectively prohibited practices."8 6 Specifically,
RICO's civil remedy provisions support the deterrence objective: by
providing treble damage awards and reasonable attorneys' fees to
successful plaintiffs, RICO enlists the assistance of private parties in
deterring the conduct it prohibits.8 7 As Professor Issacharoff notes,
"[d]eterrence is the reason that the consumer protection laws enacted
by most states provide for measures of recovery either double or triple
the wrongdoing, as well as attorneys' fees. The aim is not merely to
compensate but also to deter."88 Compensating private parties harmed
by conduct unlawful under RICO is an incidental result required to
provide these individuals with the incentive to litigate.
Congress's decision to use broad language in RICO's civil
remedy provision also indicates a deliberate policy choice: the statute's
deterrence objective takes precedence over restrictive procedure. As
the Seventh Circuit stated:
Congress chose to provide civil remedies for an enormous variety of conduct, balancing
the need to redress a broad social ill against the virtues of tight, but possibly overly
astringent, legislative draftsmanship.... Congress deliberately cast the net of liability
wide, being more concerned to avoid opening loopholes through which the minions of

85. John C.P. Goldberg et al., The Place of Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001, 1003
(2006).
86. 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000) (emphasis added).
87. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 557 ("The object of civil RICO is thus not merely to compensate
victims but to turn them into prosecutors, 'private attorneys general,' dedicated to eliminating
racketeering activity."); Holmes v. Sec. Investors Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 283 (1992) (quoting
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987)).
88. Issacharoff, supra note 38, at 144; see Daniel Z. Herbst, Comment, Injunctive Relief and
Civil RICO: After Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., RICO's Scope and
Remedies Require Reevaluation, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 1125, 1133 (2004) ("House proponents of the
RICO civil action expected that the lower burden of proof in civil actions and the possibility of
large damage awards would encourage parties to assist in the fight against organized crime."
(citing John L. Koenig, Comment, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme Court
Takes the RacketeeringRequirement Out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 832 (1986))).
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organized crime
might crawl to freedom than to avoid making garden-variety frauds
89
actionable.

While RICO's overt focus originally was to deter illegal conduct
by organized crime, 90 the plain language of the statute does not limit
its applicability to this objective. As mentioned previously, RICO's
language does not clearly define its target. 91 Instead, RICO proscribes
specific conduct. Thus, without distorting the text of the statute,
courts have read RICO's broad language to allow its application to
legitimate businesses and rejected arguments that RICO applies only
to defendants who are part of "organized crime. '92 As the Fourth
Circuit stated, "[W]e do not believe it is normally a proper judicial
function to try to cabin the plain language of a statute, even a criminal
statute, by limiting its coverage to the primary activity Congress
had in mind when it acted. ' 93 RICO's application to legitimate
businesses is within the literal meaning of the statute, even if the
statute's enactors did not specifically intend it to be so. There is no
89. Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 747 F.2d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 1984),
aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In another case, the
Supreme Court notes:
[T]he language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that Congress was
well aware that it was entering a new domain of federal involvement through the
enactment of this measure. Indeed, the very purpose of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970 was to enable the Federal Government to address a large and seemingly
neglected problem ....
That Congress included within the definition of racketeering
activities a number of state crimes strongly indicates that RICO criminalized conduct
that was also criminal under state law, at least when the requisite elements of a
RICO offense are present. As the hearings and legislative debates reveal, Congress
was well aware of the fear that RICO would "mov[e] large substantive areas formerly
totally within the police power of the State into the Federal realm." In the face of
these objections, Congress nonetheless proceeded to enact the measure, knowing that
it would alter somewhat the role of the Federal Government in the war against
organized crime and that the alteration would entail prosecutions involving acts of
racketeering that are also crimes under state law. There is no argument that
Congress acted beyond its power in so doing. That being the case, the courts are
without authority to restrict the application of the statute.
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981) (internal citations omitted).
90. The purpose of RICO is to "seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States
by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal
prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923.
91. See supranotes 31-32 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Romano, 736 F.2d 1432, 1441 (11th Cir. 1984), vacated, 755
F.2d 1401 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Defendants' contention that RICO is designed to apply only to
organized crime participants is without merit."); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 n.15
(5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), rev'd in part on other grounds, 591
F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1979) ("While addressed to organized crime, [RICO] is not limited in
application to members of that undertaking."); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363
(9th Cir. 1975) ("[RICO] makes unlawful such activities no matter who engages in them.").
93. United States v. LeFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288, 1295 (4th Cir. 1974).
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definitional ambiguity about the meaning of RICO's terms. 94 As the
Seventh Circuit said,
We recognized that RICO's language extends beyond those concerns which were the
immediate focus of the legislation, but we also recognized that Congress was fully aware
of the extraordinary breadth of the language. Even though Congress might not have
fully contemplated all the consequences or applications of those very broad terms,
Congress nevertheless deliberately chose to use
the broad terms to ensure that the
95
criminal and civil provisions would be effective.

Congress consciously refrained from defining RICO liability in
terms limited to organized crime. 96 Congress also intentionally drafted
a statute that would be broadly inclusive, understanding that it would
be applied to garden variety fraud actions previously left to the states,
because Congress was most concerned with ensuring that RICO be an
97
effective tool.
Just as courts have read RICO to apply to legitimate
businesses based on the statute's plain language, RICO's original
deterrence objective should guide how courts understand the statute
as applied to small claim mass fraud actions against such legitimate
businesses. Fraud presents enforcement problems similar to those
exposed by RICO's announced target, organized crime. Before RICO's
enactment, state and federal prosecutions of Mafia activity had
98
addressed ineffectively the national problem of organized crime,
which was costing the country billions of dollars. 99 Like organized
crime, fraud annually drains billions of dollars from the national
economy. 100 Both problems also have national dimensions. With the

94. Lynch, supra note 17, at 696.
95. Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 747 F.2d 384, 392 (7th Cir. 1984),
aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
96. Lynch, supra note 17, at 697.
97. Legislative history reveals that Congress was aware that RICO would move "large
substantive areas formerly totally within the police power of the State into the Federal realm."
116 CONG. REC. 35,217 (1970) (statement of Rep. Eckhardt); see also id. at 35,205 (statement of
Rep. Mikva) ("What we have done in one fell swoop ... is to incorporate as a part of the Federal
law all of the offenses which heretofore have traditionally been treated as under State and local
jurisdictions."); id. at 35,213 (statement of the American Civil Liberties Union) ("[RICO] creates
federal law in an area where state laws have traditionally operated ....
").
98. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981) ("[T]he very purpose of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was to enable the Federal Government to address a large
and seemingly neglected problem. The view was that existing law, state and federal, was not
adequate to address the problem, which was of national dimensions.").
99. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922 ('The
Congress finds that organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified,
and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by
unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption.").
100. 1984 ATTORNEY GEN. ANNUAL REPORT 42 (estimating that fraud accounts for losses
exceeding $200 billion annually); see, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A HANDBOOK ON WHITE

2008]

AGGREGATE LITIGATION UNDER RICO

601

growth of nationwide advertising and marketing, mass fraud
frequently crosses state borders, rendering state laws ineffective in
addressing these harms. 10 1
Meritorious small claim mass fraud actions must be permitted
to reach court in order to realize RICO's deterrence objective. As
Professor Shapiro notes:
[The small claim class action strikes me as one that serves the purpose not of
compensating those harmed in any significant sense, or of providing them a sense of
personal vindication, but rather, and perhaps entirely, the purpose of allowing a private
attorney general to contribute to social welfare by bringing an action whose effect is to
internalize to the wrongdoer the cost of the wrong. The purpose of the action, in other
words, is solely to deter the kind of wrong that causes a small injury to a large number
(just as the availability to an individual of a private civil action to recover for a
substantial injury can serve to deter the wrongful conduct of those who would cause an
equivalent social harm, but in the form of a large injury to only one victim). 102

Collective action challenging small claim mass fraud is
essential to deterring the type of harm that results in small injuries to
a large number of people. Thus, RICO should facilitate, rather than
preclude, such actions, which vindicate the statute's overarching
objective.
Recognizing the importance of deterrence in the tort context,
Professor David Rosenberg recently championed a proposal endorsing
aggregate liability. He proposed splitting mass tort adjudication into
two separate phases. 10 3 The first would determine the defendant's
liability and damages at the class-wide level. 10 4 The second would
address how to distribute these damages within the class.10 5 Professor
Rosenberg's proposal proceeds from the argument that deterrence is a
crucial policy priority that the current legal system disregards. 106 Law
should strive to achieve "optimal tort deterrence," where the law
threatens liability equal to the harm caused. 107 Short of reaching this
"optimal" level, incentives to take reasonable precautions are

COLLAR CRIME, EVERYONE'S PROBLEM, EVERYONE'S Loss 6 (1974) (economic cost of fraud exceeds
$41 billion per year).
101. Michael Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise, 71 MINN. L. REV.
827, 844-45 (1987).
102. Shapiro, supranote 7, at 924.
103. David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort
Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1875-76 (2002).
104. Id. at 1876.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1873-74.
107. Id. at 1874 ("[The c]lass action is indispensable to achieving the social objective of
minimizing the sum of accident costs through tort deterrence (prevention of unreasonable
risk).., and consequently to enhancing everyone's well-being.").
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distorted, thereby harming society.108 Professor Rosenberg argues that
aggregate adjudication of tort liability is essential to realizing this
optimal deterrence: "Because the mass producer's decision regarding
precautions inevitably and indivisibly affects a population-wide level
of safety, all that matters for optimal deterrence is that the judgment
or settlement accounts for the total aggregate tortious harm, not how
or whether it distributes damages among claimants." 10 9 Rosenberg's
article supports this Note's premise that aggregate liability can
effectuate deterrence. The very threat of litigation can alter behavior,
as this risk is something parties must factor into their decisions." 0
Absent aggregate liability in small claim mass fraud actions, the risk
that litigation will result is small; therefore, wrongdoers can continue
to realize significant gains by harming many individuals in small
amounts. As in the mass torts context, where mass production
decisions are made at a population-wide level, mass fraud is focused
on the aggregate unit. Just as Professor Rosenberg argues that
aggregate liability helps realize optimal deterrence in the tort context,
aggregate liability can help realize optimal deterrence in the mass
fraud context.
The prevailing judicial interpretation of RICO subverts optimal
deterrence because threatened tort liability falls far below the actual
harm caused. Thus, under the current judicial reading, the law is not
deterring the perpetrators of small claim mass fraud from future
unlawful behavior that causes a small injury to a large number of
people.
Reinterpreting RICO's substantive law would remove the
barrier to class certification and facilitate enforcement consistent with
the statute's core deterrence objective. RICO's legislative history
establishes that Congress intended RICO to attack and deter
fraudulent conduct. Congress did not envision restrictive enforcement
procedures; on the contrary, it contemplated flexible procedures in
support of the statute's deterrence goal. This deterrence objective
should inform how the statute is understood with respect to claims
brought against both illegitimate and legitimate businesses, as both
are encompassed within the literal meaning of the statute. The
prevailing judicial interpretation of reliance under RICO obstructs the
statute's primary deterrence purpose. For effective deterrence of
108. Id. at 1880.
109. Id. at 1892-93 ("[The crucial value of class action [is] in removing the systemic bias that
enables defendants to more fully exploit the scale economies of mass production tort litigation
than can plaintiffs and courts.").
110. William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation? A Positive Externalities Theory of the
Small Claims Class Action, 74 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 709, 724 (2006).

2008]

AGGREGATE LITIGATION UNDER RICO

603

fraudulent conduct, defendants must face a threat of liability
accompanied by a real financial penalty.'1 1 Permitting private RICO
plaintiffs to prove liability at the consumer-wide level by using
aggregate proof will strengthen private enforcement of small claim
mass fraud (thereby strengthening deterrence) because it will
facilitate class certification of claims that plaintiffs otherwise never
would bring to court. In this way, whether redress is possible will no
longer be determined by the cost of gathering information, but by the
merit of the underlying claims.
C. Aggregate Liability In Practice
1. Aggregate Proof
This Note proposes a single, aggregate proceeding to replace a
multitude of individualized trials-trials that, under the current
interpretation of RICO, are economically impractical and thus
nonexistent. The aggregate proceeding would consist of adversarial
litigation over proof affecting the entire class as one indivisible whole
and would result in an enforceable judgment, absent any
individualized inquiry or follow-on litigation to determine if each
member of the class was harmed individually.
Aggregate proof consists of an assessment of harm as it affects
the class as an indivisible whole. For example, instead of evaluating a
particular individual's reliance on a fraudulent advertisement,
aggregate proof examines the reliance of a class of individuals,
averaging any differences across the class. Such aggregate
assessments are demonstrated through statistical models. Given that
mass fraud aims to affect mass public behavior, aggregating the
millions of injuries resulting from such fraud arguably yields a more
111. A recent article substantiates the contention, through several empirical studies, that
threatened tort liability can and does deter parties from engaging in wrongdoing, including
negligence. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994). For example, malpractice liability has deterred
certain extreme forms of malpractice, and landlord liability based on failure to provide invitees
with reasonable security has led to increased hiring of security guards. Id. at 423. While
Professor Schwartz rejects an exact one-to-one relationship between the incentives created by
threatened liability and an individual's rational conduct, liability does provide a degree of
deterrence that varies depending on the particular area of law. Id. at 425-27. Small claim fraud
actions brought under RICO are predicated on the "racketeering activities" of federal mail and
wire fraud. Because Professor Schwartz concluded that the threat of liability can deter even
negligent conduct, id. at 385-86, it would seem to follow logically that deterrence value could be
even greater with regard to claims based on federal mail and wire fraud, both of which require
intentionalwrongdoing. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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accurate estimate of overall reliance and harm, because the
conclusions drawn rely on a large statistical base, which reduces the
scale of possible error.
Individualized proof, by contrast, is tied to the traditional
notion of a "day in court" ideal, meaning that each person has access
to a means of adjudication that allows her to tell her own individual
story."12 The implicit assumption that pervades this ideal is that each
story is unique to that individual and, therefore, one that only she can
tell. 113 Put simply, individualized proof consists of presenting evidence
unique to each claimant and claim.
The solution offered in this Note entails reinterpreting the
substantive law of RICO so that its constituent elements are capable
of proof in the aggregate. Class-wide proof of RICO's elements, alone,
could result in liability. Moreover, adversarial litigation over
plaintiffs' and defendants' aggregate proof would occur at trial and not
in the context of a motion for class certification. This difference is
particularly important because at least one court has recognized the
right to a jury trial in RICO civil suits. 114 Therefore, under this
proposal, a jury-and not a judge who makes class certification
rulings-would assess the credibility of the parties' aggregate models.
As Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York noted, "The
' 5
federal petty civil jury provides the ultimate focus group of the law.""
From an institutional perspective, this adjustment is appropriate, as it
is traditionally the province of the jury to balance evidence where
reasonable minds can differ as to liability.
Furthermore, the recent decision in In re Initial Public Offering
Securities Litigation ("IPO Securities") should ease concerns that
endorsing this Note's theory of aggregate liability under RICO will
result in devastating liability because juries will have the opportunity
to find defendants guilty based on weak statistical evidence. 1 6 Under
this Note's solution, any class seeking to aggregate its claims must
satisfy Rule 23. To satisfy the class certification requirements
prescribed in IPO Securities, plaintiffs' and defendants' aggregate
models must be scrutinized to ensure that Rule 23's requirements are
met." 7 This scrutiny also will ensure that purely speculative
aggregate models are withheld from the jury and that frivolous
112. Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REV.
1481, 1514-15 (1992).
113. Id.
114. See NSC Int'l. Corp. v. Ryan, 531 F. Supp. 362, 363-64 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
115. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1021 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
116. 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
117. Id. at 41.
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lawsuits never proceed past certification towards trial. Thus, even if
we assume that many large class actions will settle before they reach
trial, and that class certification is a pivotal point of litigation, truly
frivolous aggregate claims never will satisfy the requirements of IPO
Securities; therefore, this Note's solution will not result in
unreasonable settlement pressure. 118 Only claims that have satisfied
the rigorous requirements of IPO Securities will be able to threaten
the type of trial endorsed by this Note's solution.
Plaintiffs already have used aggregate evidence in various
In
In re Simon II, Judge Weinstein allowed plaintiffs to present
cases.
surveys, expert testimony, and statistical proof demonstrating the
ways in which the defendant's mass misrepresentation harmed the
nationwide class of plaintiffs seeking certification in a cigarette
case. 119 As Judge Weinstein reasoned, "[m]odern adjudicatory tools
must be adapted to allow the fair, efficient, effective, and responsive
resolution of the claims of these aggrieved masses." 120 Increased mass
production of goods for consumption by millions, combined with mass
marketing, has substantially increased the potential for large scale
injury. Methods of adjudication must adapt to this reality. Several
commentators and courts have accepted that "tools for aggregation are
especially helpful in the context of consumer fraud, when the
relatively low value of specific claims or the litigation advantages of a
well-financed defendant can discourage individuals from pressing
their claims in court." 121 To reject aggregate proof (in all class action
contexts) in favor of rigid requirements that each member of a
proposed class present individualized proof would shield many
wrongdoers from liability by foreclosing judicial remedy.
The plaintiffs' statistical evidence in Schwab v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc. illustrates the type of aggregate proof that, were it to
persuade the factfinder, would result in an enforceable judgment
against a defendant under this Note's solution. In Schwab, the
plaintiff-consumers offered evidence to establish that the major
cigarette manufacturers fraudulently marketed "light" cigarettes to
the public by claiming that they were safer than regular cigarettes
118. Judge Friendly coined settlements induced by a small probability of an immense
judgment in a class action "blackmail settlements." In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,
1298 (7th Cir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit in In re Rhone-Poulenc decertified a large class action
because it was concerned that the defendant, facing billions in potential liability on the outcome
of a single jury trial, would be under intense pressure to settle the case even though the Court
believed the plaintiffs' claims lacked legal merit. 51 F.3d 1293.
119. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 127-29, 146-52 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated on other
grounds, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005).
120. Schwab, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 1245.
121. In re Simon HLitig., 211 F.R.D. at 151.
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when the manufacturers knew that "light" cigarettes, when smoked,
would deliver the same amount of nicotine. 122 The plaintiffs sought to
prove that, in reliance on the defendants' deceptive advertising, they
bought "light" cigarettes at a price greater than they would have paid
had they known the truth. 123 As a result, they were entitled to
damages.
To prove their claim, the plaintiffs offered aggregate evidence
in the form of statistical models that purported to prove class-wide
reliance and damages. 124 The statistical evidence included an expert
report by Dr. Hauser 125 that used conjoint analysis-a recognized
method of measuring consumer preferences-to assess the proportion
of "light" cigarette smokers who purchased these cigarettes for health
reasons. 126 Dr. Hauser concluded that for 90.1 percent of "light"
cigarette consumers, reduced health risk was a positive reason for
their purchasing decisions, greater than all other tested factors,
including taste and packaging. 127 In essence, Dr. Hauser's finding
purports to estimate how the class of cigarette plaintiffs relied on the
health assurance messages, as distinct from drawing generalized
conclusions about the class' reliance from a sample of individuals.
While Judge Weinstein conceded that the plaintiffs needed to further
tailor their class-wide evidence to the particular class of light cigarette
consumers seeking damages, he admitted these aggregate statistics as
evidence. 128 Using that evidence, another expert in Schwab, Dr.
Harris, 12 9 assessed, on a per cigarette basis, the difference between the

122. Id. at 1018.
123. Id. at 1019-20.
124. Id. at 1022.
125. Dr. Hauser is an expert in marketing management, consumer satisfaction, and
marketing research:
He has served as an expert witness in connection with a range of disputes. Most of his
expert testimony has involved surveys and other market research to measure
consumers' attitudes, beliefs, and intentions. He has been called upon to project what
consumers would have done in different market scenarios, to measure the importance
of product features, to measure the impact of rumors, to evaluate marketing research
with respect to advertising claims, and to investigate the potential for consumer
confusion.
Id. at 1166-67.
126. Id. at 1167.
127. Id. at 1168.
128. Id. at 1170.
129. Dr. Jeffrey Harris is an economics professor at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. Id. at 1163. He was an expert witness in Falise v. American Tobacco Co., 107 F.
Supp. 2d 200 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), and in Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey v. Philip Morris,
141 F. Supp. 2d 320 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). Id. He also testified in United States v. Philip Morris on the
economics of collusion. Id. In Schwab, he was called as an economic expert to testify with regard

2008]

AGGREGATE LITIGATION UNDER RICO

607

prices consumers paid for light cigarettes represented as being
healthier and the price consumers would have paid had the cigarettes
offered no greater health benefits, as was the case. 130 Using a "benefit
of the bargain" measure of damages, Dr. Harris' findings purport to
establish class damages in the aggregate. 131 In essence, both Dr.
Hauser and Dr. Harris constructed models that estimated actual
reliance and damages at the aggregate, class-wide level. Under the
solution offered in this Note, this aggregate proof could result in an
enforceable judgment against Philip Morris. Proof of harm at the
entity level could result in an aggregate class-wide damage award.
Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the decision in IPO
Securities should alleviate concerns that allowing aggregate liability
under RICO will result in devastating liability to defendants based on
frivolous statistical evidence. 3 2 In IPO Securities, the Second Circuit,
clarifying the standard governing motions for class certification under
Rule 23, held that class certification cannot occur until a judge has
ruled definitively that each of the Rule 23 requirements has been
met. 133 This inquiry is required even if it entails some analysis of the
merits of plaintiffs' overall case. 34 Moreover, in resolving the issue,
the judge must assess all the evidence concerning Rule 23, including
135
that of the defendants.
The solution proposed in this Note does not circumvent Rule
23's requirements for class certification. Any class seeking to
aggregate its claims still needs to satisfy Rule 23's fundamental
procedural hurdles of commonality, numerosity, typicality, adequate
representation, predominance, and superiority. 136 Under this Note's
solution, however, the aggregate nature of small claim mass harm
would not be at issue at the certification stage, as this is a question of
law dependant on courts' interpretation of RICO. Still, plaintiffs' and
defendants' aggregate models proving injury would be tested at the
class certification stage in order to satisfy the standard established by
IPO Securities. The accuracy of the parties' models would determine
whether Rule 23's requirements are satisfied definitively. For
example, plaintiffs' aggregate models would be offered to establish
to "two specific economic methodologies that could be used to compute class-wide damages in the
event that the proposed class is certified and the suit goes to trial." Id.
130. Id. at 1163-64.
131. Id. at 1057, 1163-64.
132. For the relevant facts of this case, see 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d. Cir. 2006).
133. Id. at 41.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.

608

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2:579

that common issues predominate over individual ones, as well as
whether injury has been proven. Moreover, the credibility of plaintiffs'
models would be scrutinized, as IPO Securities requires that the court
also evaluate defendants' models in determining whether Rule 23's
requirements are satisfied. Put simply, the scrutiny required by IPO
Securities at class certification ensures that purely speculative
aggregate models are withheld from the jury. Therefore, even if
settlement is likely once a large class is certified, this Note's solution
does not create unreasonable settlement pressure, because the
decision in IPO Securities ensures that only strong claims can
threaten trial.
2. Damages
Damage awards resulting from the aggregate proceeding
proposed in this Note are a type of hybrid remedy: an indivisible
monetary award. Unlike an injunction, the classic indivisible remedy,
this award purports to measure the actual harm to consumers in the
aggregate. Yet, unlike a typical monetary judgment, this award is
indivisible because, as a practical matter, courts would award relief to
the class as a collective entity, and the award does not represent the
sum of individual judgments that can be distributed easily.
In terms of how this aggregate award will be distributedamong
the class, Schwab presents a potential model. In Schwab, the
plaintiffs proposed distributing total damages on a shareholder-like
basis, based on the number of cigarettes class members purchased
during the applicable liability period. 137 This scheme allows individual
class members to recover their share of the total damages through a
streamlined claim procedure, as opposed to a cumbersome, formal
mini-trial. This type of distribution is called a "fluid recovery,"
138
meaning there is no individualized determination of damages.

137. 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1019-20 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see Craft v. Philip Morris Co., No. 00200406A, 2003 WL 23355745 (Mo. Cir. Dec 31, 2003). In this cigarette case, a Missouri court
endorsed Plaintiffs' plan to divide the total damage award based on the quantity of cigarettes
each class member consumed. Id. at *9-10. The court stated that it "believe[d] that under the
'fluid recovery doctrine,' it is possible that a common fund may be created, and proof of damages
may be handled through a streamlined administrative claims process without the requirement
for individual trials on damages." Id. at *10 (internal citation omitted). The court conceded that
"at least to some extent, proof and apportionment of class damages will require some individual
proof, given that it will hinge in large part on how many packs of Marlboro Lights a person has
purchased". Id.
138. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156
(1974).
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Instead, the jury awards a bulk sum to the class as a whole, which the
39
court then determines how to distribute.'
However, a fluid recovery is not always an appropriate method
of distributing damages; its suitability depends on the objectives of the
underlying substantive law. 140 For instance, the court in Simer v. Rios
noted that fluid recovery is particularly appropriate to deter illegal
conduct when the statute underlying the claim is "intended to regulate
socially opprobrious conduct such as that reflected in the antitrust or
securities laws."'14 1 Fluid recovery is appropriate in the context of a
RICO claim based on fraud because civil RICO's primary policy
objective, like that of the antitrust laws, is deterrence, as
demonstrated by its private attorney general provision and legislative
history. Precluding fluid recovery in small action fraud claims under
RICO would subvert the statute's underlying policy objective because,
without this relief, plaintiffs would not bring legitimate claims to
court, and as a result, defendants would continue to engage in the
conduct RICO proscribes. As a California court noted:
Absent the use of fluid class recovery, some class actions, those where proof of individual
claims is impractical, would neither compensate nor deter, for "to allow the defendant to
insist upon proof of individual claims will enable it to benefit from the cumbersome
nature of legal proceedings and the lack of sophistication and indolence of the consumer,
14 2
and will reward his foresight in stealing from the multitude in small amounts."

Moreover, even when fluid recovery is appropriate, such a
scheme involves a risk of overcompensating certain class members
and undercompensating others. For example, in Schwab, while the
expert evidence used to establish liability purports to prove the class's
aggregate reliance on the assumption that only some of the class
members relied on the fraud, the class proposes to distribute the
aggregate damage award based on the quantity of cigarettes each
class member consumed, irrespective of the individual member's
actual reliance. 143 The advantages of such an equitable pro rata
139. Id.
140. Schwab, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 1255 ("Whether or not fluid recovery should be employed in
a particular class action is determined by reference to the need to vindicate the substantive law
at issue." (citing Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 676-78 (7th Cir. 1981))); Note, Developments in the
Law--Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1525-26 (1976) (stating that courts should
determine the appropriateness of fluid recovery in reference to the underlying substantive law).
141. Simer, 661 F.2d at 676-77; California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 472 (1986)
("Without fluid recovery, defendants may be permitted to retain ill gotten gains simply because
their conduct harmed large numbers of people in small amounts instead of small numbers of
people in large amounts.").
142. Bruno v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342, 345-46 (Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Jonathan
M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the
Substance-ProcedureDilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 868 (1974).
143. 449 F. Supp. 2d at 1019-20.
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scheme of distributing an aggregate damage award lie in the accuracy
of the claims submitted by class members. To this effect, a limited
individualized inquiry prior to a pro rata division of damages may be
the ideal method of ensuring the accuracy of the distribution and
curbing the frivolous submission of claims.
In Schwab, Judge Weinstein recommended adopting such a
twofold strategy. Weinstein suggested that the court require
''claimants to submit affidavits regarding their understanding of the
health issues surrounding 'light' cigarettes and their reliance on the
'lights' descriptor in addition to information regarding their cigarette
purchases" to alleviate concerns that the quantity-based recovery
144
scheme might over- or undercompensate certain class members.
Carrying out such a limited individualized inquiry would operate as a
check on the submission of fraudulent claims so that a later pro rata
division of damages would distribute damages fairly among the class
members. In sum, one way to distribute an aggregate award rendered
under this Note's solution would be to provide for a fluid class recovery
and require a limited individualized inquiry in order to check frivolous
submissions.
IV. WHY AGGREGATE LIABILITY DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS

Some critics may contend that allowing aggregate liability
violates defendants' due process rights, as averaging entails a risk
that unharmed claims will be compensated. They may argue that
defendants have a due process interest in compensating each plaintiff
only for the exact amount of harm sustained. However, this argument
lacks merit because the possibility of error in aggregate valuation lies
in the distribution of damages among plaintiffs. While this potential
error may be relevant to individual plaintiffs, from the defendant's
perspective, only the accuracy of the total amount of damages assessed
against it should be relevant. 145 To that end, there is no reason to
assume that aggregate valuation of total damages will not be
144. Id. at 1269.
145. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 288-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In this
case, Defendants alleged that denying them the opportunity to assess whether each consumer
can prove individual harm violated their due process rights. Id. at 280. The court rejected this
contention, stating "that the defendants are [not] constitutionally entitled to compel a parade of
individual plaintiffs to establish damages." Id. at 289. Their due process rights relate only to the
accuracy of the total damages assessed against them. Id.; see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 839 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("No matter what system is used the purpose is to
hold a defendant liable for no more than the aggregate loss fairly attributable to its ... conduct.
As long as that goal is met a defendant can have no valid objection that its rights have been
violated.").
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reasonably accurate. 146 Indeed, any overcompensation of certain
plaintiffs likely will be offset by undercompensation of others,
resulting in an aggregate award that correlates with the aggregate
loss of the plaintiffs.
Furthermore, individual adjudications do not guarantee a
correlation between the sum of settlements awarded and actual
harm. 147 The arbitrary nature of jury awards produces a variety of
outcomes
that
overcompensate
certain
plaintiffs
while
undercompensating others: "no one with a modicum of trial experience
will imagine that the traditional common-law trial, the jury trial
especially, is an instrument of fact-finding precision." 148 Moreover,
because small claim actions will not be redressed absent claim
aggregation, aggregate valuation might provide a truer measure of the
harm inflicted on consumers than would the sum of damage awards
from individual adjudications. While defendants may prefer a system
that forces individualized adjudication of small claim mass fraud
actions because it would (1) deter plaintiffs from bringing small,
unmarketable claims to court and (2) allow defendants to take
advantage of economies of scale by overpowering individual claimants
with superior resources, such a preference does not implicate
149
constitutional due process.
Due process involves a balancing of many interests. As
Professor David Shapiro notes,

146. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. at 288-89 ('Most important management
decisions in the business world in which these defendants operate are made through the
intelligent application of statistical and computer techniques and these class members should be
entitled to use the same techniques in proving the elements of their cause of action. The court is
confident that they can be successfully utilized in the courtroom and that their application will
allow the consumers to protect their rights while freeing the court and the defendants of the
specter of unmanageability."); Cicelski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 348 N.W.2d 685, 690 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1984) ("[Defendants] hardly seemf prejudiced by being restricted to only one hearing on
common issues. Even though the calculation of damages might involve issues on which a hearing
would... be required[,] ... it has never been thought that due process required multiple
hearings when there was one full and fair adjudication of the merits." (quoting Note, supra note
140, at 1524-25); Robinson & Abraham, supra note 112, at 1504.
147. Shapiro, supra note 7, at 932. This is particularly true when a mass fraud inflicts only a
small amount of harm on many individuals: "When the individual claims are small, 'traditional
methods of proof [may not be] worthwhile,' since many consumers are unlikely to 'retain records
of small purchases for long periods of time.'" Schwab, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 1253 (citing California
v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 472 (1986)).
148. Robinson & Abraham, supra note 112, at 1504; see also Christopher J. Roche, Note, A
Litigation Association Model to Aggregate Mass Tort Claims for Adjudication, 91 VA. L. REV.
1463, 1506 (2005) (citing Professors Saks and Blanck as cautioning against an over-emphasis on
individualized adjudication, noting that, in such adjudications, a verdict is really "only a sample
from a wider population of possible outcomes").
149. Robinson & Abraham, supra note 112, at 1505.
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[N]otions of individual choice, autonomy, and participation-and their resonance in the
constitutional guarantee of due process-are not so rigid that they cannot yield to
practical arguments about the nature of the case, the character of the wrong complained
of, and the individual
interests at stake, as well as the countervailing interests and
15 0
preference of others.

In effect, given the practical reality that requiring
individualized proof from each member of the proposed class will block
claim aggregation and, in doing so, defeat these claims before they are
brought to court, due process should be understood in the small claim
mass fraud context to permit aggregate valuation in place of the
traditional procedure of individualized proof. As Judge Weinstein
articulated, while defendants have an interest in compensating each
plaintiff only for the exact amount of harm caused, an interest
arguably best protected by requiring individual adjudication,
"practical considerations temper the weight of [that interest]. '' 15 1
VI. CONCLUSION

The solution offered in this Note would allow the consumers
injured by the miracle pill fraud to form a class (provided they meet
Rule 23's threshold requirements) to redress their harms collectively,
thereby restoring the necessary economic incentive to bring their
legitimate claims to court. While $10 claims are unmarketable
individually, an aggregate claim of billions of dollars of damages
represents an economically viable lawsuit that will threaten the
producers of the miracle pill with liability approximating the
nationwide harm caused.
Under the prevailing interpretation of RICO, which requires
individualized proof of reliance and injury, the miracle pill consumers
face certain denial of class certification based on Rule 23's
predominance requirement, and this denial, in turn, defeats these
claims before they ever reach the courthouse. In contrast, allowing
aggregate proof to establish liability under RICO would give these
consumers a real opportunity to seek redress. Moreover, if the court
certifies the miracle pill class under Rule 23, under this Note's
solution, the class will present its aggregate proof at trial, and if the
factfinders are persuaded, a monetary judgment will be entered
against the miracle pill company. Reinterpreting the prevailing
understanding of RICO's substantive law so as to facilitate such a

150. Shapiro, supra note 7, at 925; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-48 (1976)
(describing the balance required in procedural due process).
151. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 153 (E.D.N.Y, 2002), vacated, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.
2005).
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damage award, which threatens a company with liability that
corresponds to the harm it caused, serves RICO's primary statutory
purpose: deterrence. In creating the RICO statute, Congress did not
envision restrictive enforcement procedures; on the contrary, it
contemplated flexible procedures in support of the statute's deterrence
goal. Under this Note's solution, companies planning to perpetrate
mass fraud like that of the miracle pill will have to factor the risk of
litigation into their decisionmaking, as such fraud no longer escapes
liability merely because it causes a small injury to many individuals.
The solution advanced in this Note removes a major barrier
preventing consumers harmed by small claim mass fraud from
seeking relief and replaces this obstacle with a practical solution for
redress.
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